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Abstract
This article examines the organisation of VOX, a new radical right party in Spain. It shows that the party has taken early and
uneven steps to build a mass organisation and initially opted for open membership recruitment with participatory organi‐
sational elements. Also, the party’s rapid growth and quick entrance into political institutions at different state levels led
the party leadership to establish more centralised control and limit members’ prerogatives, though recruitment continued.
Centralisation in part responds to organisational needs given the party’s quickly acquired political relevance, but also to
the desire of the central party leadership to forestall the articulation of territorial interests, or prevent them from escaping
their control. Today, VOX exhibits elements of mass party organisation and highly centralised decision‐making in the hands
of national party leaders.
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1. Introduction
For several decades, Spain was one of the countries that
stood out from European trends due to the absence of a
relevant radical right party (Alonso & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2015). However, between late 2018 and 2019, the
radical right VOX (which means “voice” in Latin) very
rapidly gained a significant electoral and institutional
presence. Its organisational development has struggled
to keep pace.
Because the radical right parties that first drew the
attention of scholars, such as the French National Front,
had charismatic leadership, some have considered them
charismatic parties (Eatwell, 2018). In order to guar‐
antee internal cohesion, charismatic parties tend to
have weak organisation, a skeletal bureaucratic appara‐
tus, and highly centralised decision‐making that leads
to low levels of institutionalization (Panebianco, 1988).
However, not all radical right parties have a charismatic
origin (Eatwell, 2018).
Nonetheless, Panebianco’s genetic model is a use‐
ful framework for analysing organisational development.
This article examines VOX, a party that has developed
through territorial penetration, directed by the central
party leadership, andwithout external institutional spon‐
sorship (such as from a union or confessional group)
or charismatic leadership (Eliassen & Svaasand, 1975;
Panebianco, 1988). We refer to VOX simply as a radical
right party, without the populist descriptor, which we
explain below.
This article examines the extent to which VOX is striv‐
ing to develop a mass party organization. According to
the definition used in this thematic issue, a mass party
organization is characterized by (a) the drive to recruit a
large activist membership, (b) rootedness on the ground
and the provision of a variety of activities to members
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(Albertazzi & van Kessel, 2021), and (c) the preservation
of “collective identities through ideology” (Panebianco,
1988, p. 268) by creating closed political communities
of activists, by promoting social integration among them
and by shaping their interpretations of political develop‐
ments (Albertazzi, 2016). We pay particular attention to
VOX’s territorial penetration, membership recruitment,
the role of social media in creating collective identity and
activists, and the degree to which decision‐making in the
party is centralised.
Many new parties have a political renewal agenda
that encourages them to adopt a more participatory
organisational model (Müller‐Rommel, 1990), although
this is not necessarily the case for populist radical right
parties (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016). Yet, according to
the notion of party lifespan (Pedersen, 1982), gaining
political relevance often goes along with organisational
change to guarantee centralised control in new parties
(Bolleyer, 2013).
This article shows that VOX has taken early and
uneven steps to build a mass organisation and initially
opted for open membership recruitment with participa‐
tory organisational elements. Also, its rapid growth and
quick entrance into political institutions at different state
levels led the party leadership to establish more cen‐
tralised control and limit members’ prerogatives, though
recruitment continued. Centralisation relates to organi‐
sational needs—given the party’s quickly acquired polit‐
ical relevance—but also to the desire of the central
party leadership to forestall the articulation of terri‐
torial interests or check them. The party’s staunchly
Spanish nationalist and state centralist ideology thus also
affected its organisational choices. Today, VOX exhibits
elements of mass party organisation and highly cen‐
tralised decision‐making in the hands of national party
leaders in Madrid.
The article is organised as follows: The next section
provides a brief history of the party. The third exam‐
ines the steps it has taken to build a mass organisa‐
tion. The fourth section analyses the progressive cen‐
tralisation of decision‐making and related internal con‐
flict. A final section briefly concludes. The article draws
on party documents, media coverage, interviews with
five VOX leaders at the regional and national level (see
Supplementary File), and the secondary literature.
2. VOX: A Brief History
This section outlines the origins of VOX, its ideology, and
the rapid electoral rise that shaped its development.
VOX can be considered a radical right split from the
Partido Popular (PP), Spain’s main conservative party
since the 1980s, in terms of its voter base and many of
its founding leaders (Alonso & Field, 2021; Barrio, 2020;
Rama et al., 2021; Sangiao, 2018). VOX was founded
in December 2013, in the midst of a severe economic
and political crisis, which included far‐reaching corrup‐
tion scandals, particularly affecting the PP, and rising ten‐
sions surrounding Catalonia’s political status. The party
presented itself as the answer to the multiple overlap‐
ping crises. VOX denigrated the PP, under the leader‐
ship of Mariano Rajoy, for what it considered a feeble
response to challenges to Spain’s national identity and
territorial integrity. Santiago Abascal, VOX’s leader since
2014, refers to the PP as the “cowardly right” (derechita
cobarde). The party took off electorally in the after‐
math of the independence push in Catalonia, which cul‐
minated in a unilateral declaration of independence in
October 2017 and the suspension of Catalonia’s auton‐
omy by the Rajoy government. The party has been rele‐
vant in Spanish politics since 2018.
VOX has much in common with populist radical
right parties in Europe (Mudde, 2007, pp. 13–26), with
national specificities. Yet, it is foremost a Spanish nation‐
alist party that espouses and defends the unity of
a single Spanish nation, patriotism, and Spanish sym‐
bols and cultural practices, such as bullfighting. It advo‐
cates for political re‐centralisation of the Spanish state
and shows particular disdain for Spain’s own peripheral
national identities and leaders in Catalonia, the Basque
Country, and elsewhere. Thus, VOX’s primary antago‐
nists are “those ‘threatening’ their idea of Spain from
the inside” (Marcos‐Marne et al., 2021, p. 4). The first
10 measures in its 2018 manifesto, VOX’s 100 Urgent
Measures for Spain, come under the heading “Spain,
Unity & Sovereignty” (VOX, 2018), including the suspen‐
sion of Catalonia’s autonomy (measure no. 1), the ban‐
ning of parties, associations, and nongovernmental orga‐
nizations that seek to “destroy the territorial unity of the
nation” (no. 2), the protection of national symbols (no. 3),
and the establishment of a unitary state (no. 6). Indeed,
support for the party in its 2018 electoral breakthrough
in the region of Andalusia is linked to voter preferences
on territorial issues (Turnbull‐Dugarte, 2019a).
VOX also identifies external enemies and, similar to
European populist radical right parties, is nativist and
hostile toward Islam. The party explicitly links immigra‐
tion to problems of law and order, and has accused
unaccompanied migrant minors of being thieves and
responsible for a wave of violence (VOX, 2020a). In the
2021 election for the Madrid regional parliament, the
party hung a poster in the commuter train station
that displayed an elderly, white woman and a hooded,
masked, dark‐skinned youth, with the false statement:
“AMENA [a depreciative acronym for unaccompanied for‐
eign minors] 4,700 Euros a month. Your grandmother
426‐euro pension/month. VOX. Protect Madrid. Vote
safe” (Blanco, 2021; authors’ translation). VOX is less
hostile to, and has at times shown support for, Latin
American immigrants, whom the party portrays as more
apt to assimilate because of linguistic and cultural ties
(Sosa, 2018). While the party is clearly nativist, immigra‐
tion has not been the party’s core issue. In its 2018 man‐
ifesto of 100 urgent measures, those related to “Spain,
Unity & Sovereignty” appear before immigration mea‐
sures (VOX, 2018).
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The party champions traditional, highly conservative
values. It is resolutely antifeminist, putting centre‐stage
its opposition to “gender ideology” and the dismantling
of what it refers to as feminist, LGBTQ, and other leftist
“lobbies” (Bernardez‐Rodal et al., 2020; Olivas Osuna &
Rama, 2021). In this way, it shares traits with Poland’s
Law and Justice Party. One of its signature policy priori‐
ties is to allow parents to require schools to ask for their
express consent (pin parental/parental veto) before any
school activity related to gender, feminism or sexual ori‐
entation. In contrast to some radical right parties that
have moved to the centre on socio‐economic issues
(de Lange, 2007), VOX is neoliberal on socio‐economic
issues, stressing the reduction of taxes and the role of
the state in the economy and social programs.
While there is wide scholarly consensus that VOX
is a radical right party, disagreement remains about
the degree to which the party was or is populist (e.g.,
Anduiza, 2018; Ferreira, 2019; Marcos‐Marne et al.,
2021; Olivas Osuna&Rama, 2021). UsingMudde’s (2007,
p. 23) definition, populism is:
A thin‐centered ideology that considers society to
be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the
corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should
be an expressionof the volonté générale (generalwill)
of the people.
Populism, while present, was initially not prominent
in the party’s discourse (Anduiza, 2018; Ferreira, 2019;
Marcos‐Marne et al., 2021), though it may be on the rise
(Olivas Osuna & Rama, 2021).
Nonetheless, as a new, challenger party, political
renewal and opposition to political insiders is clearly
present (Barrio, in press). For example, in its 2018 man‐
ifesto, the party called for the reform of the electoral
system, the elimination of candidate quotas (gender or
otherwise) for elections, and the strengthening of legis‐
lation regarding incompatibilities for public officials once
they leave office (VOX, 2018). The party’s leaders fre‐
quently divide society into true Spaniards and traitors to
Spain, or anti‐Spaniards, harkening back to the rhetoric
of the Franco dictatorship. However, this division does
not neatly align with a corrupt elite/pure people dis‐
tinction prominent in populism (see also Marcos‐Marne
et al., 2021). Given the ongoing scholarly debate, and
becausewedonot independentlymeasure populism,we
refer to the party simply as radical right.
VOX does not explicitly advocate for an undemocratic
political regime (Acha, 2019; Ferreira, 2019). However, it
has attracted members with clear ties to organisations
that are openly Francoist (Ramsay & Provost, 2019) and
it employs dog whistles in its discourse. For example, in
2020, Abascal accused the Sánchez government of being
“the worst government in 80 years” (García, 2020), a
timeframe that includes the Franco dictatorship. At the
same time, it infuses its discourse with references to lib‐
eralism and freedom. It is staunchly authoritarian in its
values, stressing law, order, and respect for authority.
VOX first presented candidates in the 2014 European
parliament elections, winning only 1.6% of the vote and
no seats. It performed poorly in national parliamentary
elections in 2015 and 2016 (0.2% in each). This waswhen
Podemos and Ciudadanos (Cs) broke the dominance of
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and PP in
Spain’s national party system.
In December 2018, VOX achieved a surprise break‐
through in the regional elections in Andalusia, Spain’s
most populous region (Turnbull‐Dugarte, 2019a). This
was the first election outside of Catalonia since the inde‐
pendence push there. VOX won nearly 11% of the vote
and seats in the fragmented parliament. Subsequently,
it supported a right‐wing minority government of the
PP and Cs. A few months later, in April 2019, VOX won
10% of the vote in Spain’s parliamentary elections and
entered parliament with 7% of the seats.
Parliament failed to form a government. In new elec‐
tions in November 2019, VOX won 15% of the vote,
making it the third largest party in parliament with
15% of the seats. The party closed in on the PP (21%)
and surpassed previous newcomers Cs (7%) and Unidas
Podemos (UP; 13%).
In between, in May 2019, Spain held European, local,
and regional elections in 12 regions, with VOX winning
seats in seven regional parliaments (the party had also
won representation in the region of Valencia back in
April). In this period, VOX supported PP‐Cs governments
in the Madrid and Murcia regions and in the City of
Madrid, won 529 seats in local parliaments, and entered
the European parliament with three seats. In the 2020
Basque andGalician elections, where peripheral national
identities are more prominent, it only gained one seat
in the Basque parliament. Yet, in 2021, it entered the
Catalan parliament with 8% of the seats, overtaking PP
and Cs.
Based on the April 2019 national elections, VOX sup‐
porters tended to be at the higher end of the income
and education scales and urban residents, unlike many
European populist radical right voters (Turnbull‐Dugarte
et al., 2020). Men, right wing political ideology, church
attendance, and dissatisfaction with democracy are pos‐
itively associated with voting for VOX. The most impor‐
tant predictor of a vote for VOX was a strong attachment
to Spanish national identity combined with a negative
evaluation of the existing political situation.
Having provided this short history, we examine the
party’s efforts to build amass organisation between2014
and 2020.
3. Steps Toward Building a Mass‐Party Organisation
Despite being a new party, VOX is not innovative in
its organisation. It has adopted a model, in nascent
form, comparable to that of mass parties. As conceptu‐
alized in the introduction to this thematic issue, mass
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parties exhibit the drive to recruit a large activist mem‐
bership, rootedness on the ground and the provision
of a variety of activities to members, and the preserva‐
tion of collective identities through ideology (Albertazzi
& van Kessel, 2021).
Uneven recruitment and weak organisation char‐
acterized VOX’s initial years. While the party made
efforts to develop its organisation, electoral growth out‐
paced organisational development. This section exam‐
ines (a) the degree of party organisation, paying partic‐
ular attention to territorial penetration, (b) membership
recruitment, and (c) the role of social media in creating
collective identity and activists.
3.1. Territorial Penetration and Rootedness on
the Ground
From its founding, VOX aspired to develop a full‐fledged
party organisation andorganised according to the branch
model with a clear predominance of vertical links
between branches and the central party. The party estab‐
lished local, provincial, and national branches. It has
been extending its reach throughout the territory, espe‐
cially since accessing Spain’s political institutions in
late 2018–2019. It is present in all provinces, though
unevenly. In accordance with the territorial penetra‐
tion model (Eliassen & Svaasand, 1975), the centre
directed its development—to the point that the national
leadership has often appointed the subnational execu‐
tives. Provincial branches only have a right to designate
their own leadership if they have over 500 members.
Candidates to the provincial executive posts need the for‐
mal backing of at least 10% of the provincial fee‐paying
party members to be able to register as candidates.
Contrary to Duverger’s (1954) expectation, the
party’s territorial articulation does not reflect the admin‐
istrative structure of the state in that there are no
regional (autonomous community) branches. Instead,
the party has national, provincial, and local branches.
Provinces are administrative units that are typically
smaller and less powerful than the autonomous commu‐
nities are. This is, in large part, because of VOX’s ideologi‐
cal opposition to political decentralisation. The twomain
state‐wide parties, PP and PSOE, adjust policy positions
and salience to the regional context, thereby generating
a certain level of cross‐regional variation. VOX, by con‐
trast, insists that itsmessage is uniform. According to one
VOX leader: “Even the internal organisation of the party
is designed so that the same is said throughout Spain”
(Interview no. 5).
This is an anomaly in multilevel political systems
including Spain, where all state‐wide parties have
regional branches. The existence of regional branches
favours the development of territorial interests within
parties, a source of tension between the centre and the
periphery. At the same time, it forces parties to bal‐
ance regional power within them. Thus, VOX’s decision
is also a deliberate attempt to build a highly centralised
organisation with a unitary model of vertical integration
(Thorlakson, 2009), and to block incentives for articulat‐
ing regional interests.
The highest executive body is the National Executive
Committee (NEC). The General Assembly elects the NEC
using a closed list ballot(s). It has only 12 members
(including the president, three vice presidents, general
secretary, and treasurer), assisted by 13 vice secretariats,
who are not part of it. The founders’ territorial concerns
are also reflected in its design
The provincial presidents are not on the [National]
Executive Committee because we do not want the
provincial presidents to influence a decision in favour
of their provinces….We very much insist on that; we
do not want to be a federal party like other parties.
(Interview no. 3)
The main individual offices are the President, who has
the highest executive and representative powers, and
the Secretary General, who carries out organisational
functions. The NEC is clearly the dominant party body.
According to one VOX leader:
In VOX, the truth is that we are very close because we
are also all good friends; no, but there is an Executive
Committee that we call the centre. Any decision on
an agreement, any decision on the program, any deci‐
sion on territorial organisation goes to the executive
committee, which sometimes meets once a week,
sometimes every fifteen days. (Interview no. 3)
The General Assembly is, formally, the highest body of
the party. It comprises all party members. There is no
broader decision‐making body than the NEC between
General Assemblies, since the Political Council that the
General Assembly elects only has advisory functions.
Party staff remained at a bare minimum of five or six
until 2018 (“VOX refuerza su estructura,” 2019). In 2018,
VOX employed 16 people, which increased to 34 in 2019
(Torres, 2020).
Along with building structures on the ground, the
party has sought to recruit an activist membership, to
which we turn.
3.2. Member Recruitment
The day of its public debut in January 2014, VOX called
on Spanish voters to join the party’s ranks. The intention
to build a mass party becomes apparent when one con‐
siders how simple joining the party was, according to its
2014 statutes. It only required paying a monthly fee and
signing the party’s foundational manifesto. Recruitment
led to ideological heterogeneity, as it afforded little
control to party leaders over whom joined the party,
and for what purpose. Like many new parties, VOX
also initially offered members participation in internal
decisions, in particular the selection of internal officers
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and candidates for public office through party elections.
However, formally and in practice, internal democracy
would decline over time.
In the early years, volunteers carried out everyday
party functions. Party members held several organisa‐
tional positions simultaneously and even provided funds
to organise party events (Segurola, 2014). When its big
electoral leap took place in 2018–2019, these partymem‐
bers added elected office to their other posts. This con‐
tributed to a de facto, if not de jure, concentration of
power around some individuals across all organisational
levels. One reason for recruiting members was to help
finance the party’s operations, since the party had no
access to public funds. Public funding after 2018 would
also facilitate organisational development. The party
received EUR 4,160,056 in public funding in 2019 and
EUR 9,865,450 in 2020 (VOX, 2021), though the party
supports ending public subsidies for political parties and
unions (VOX, 2020b). The proportion of public funding
increased from zero in 2018 to 61% in 2019 and 66%
in 2020.
VOX’s membership and electoral growth had more
to do with political events than specific party actions.
By 2016, the party had approximately 3,000 members.
This increased significantly in the aftermath of the failed
secession attempt by the Catalan independence move‐
ment in the fall of 2017 (Barrio, 2020). The second leap
occurred after the censure motion in June 2018 against
the PP government of PrimeMinisterMariano Rajoy that
brought Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and PSOE to gov‐
ernment. According to VOX’s data, it reached more than
20,000 members in 2018 (see Table 1). Another jump
occurred after VOX’s electoral success in December 2018
in Andalusia. The party reported exceeding 36,000 mem‐
bers in March 2019, and 52,000 after the November
2019 general elections. After the failed censure motion
in October 2020, lodged by VOX against Prime Minister
Sánchez and the PSOE‐UP coalition, the party claimed it
had more than 60,000 members (Barrio, in press).






Source: Data for 2017 from Ballesteros (2018); data for 2018
fromValls (2018); data for 2019 fromValls (2020); data for 2020
from “VOX recibió” (2021).
In its March 2020 statutes, and due to the organisa‐
tion’s rapid growth, VOX made some changes concern‐
ing new joiners. For instance, it established a provisional
period of nine months during which new affiliates would
have limited rights (new members were allowed to vote
in internal processes but not eligible to be candidates
for office). The NEC can also deny full membership to
people—also an indication of progressive centralisation
of decision‐making. At the same time, the party intro‐
duced the status of “sympathizer” to bring in those who
collaborate with the party’s activities or contribute finan‐
cially without being members: This offers a laxer connec‐
tion to the party that many other parties also use to pro‐
mote societal penetration.
Recruitment has been geographically uneven from
the beginning. Party building gathered momentum in
the aftermath of the first party primaries to elect the
national leadership in July 2014. In September and
October 2014, the party established Provincial Executive
Committees (PECs), also through internal elections. PECs
formed in only 15 out of 52 Spanish provinces, since VOX
had few members and no grass‐roots territorial organ‐
isations on which to rely. At the end of 2014, Madrid
and Valencia were strongholds in terms of members and
structure. Six years later, Murcia and Andalusia have also
become organisational bastions.
VOX’s initial open recruitment model attracted a het‐
erogeneous group of people to the party. Two elements
were however common to most new members: they
had no previous political experience and volunteered
their free time to the party (Interviews no. 2 and no. 4).
When presenting a plan for party reorganisation at the
2019 General Assembly, Javier Ortega Smith, the party’s
General Secretary, admitted that pre‐2019 VOX was an
“amateur” party and that its cadres lacked “training”
(“VOX refuerza su estructura,” 2019).
VOX’s model for organising members is exclusively
territorial and, unlike many new parties, it does not
have virtual groups, though it makes extensive use of
social networks. Formally, it does not have a sectoral
structure and has not developed affiliated mass organ‐
isations. The only exception is Solidaridad, the union
formed in 2020.
Nonetheless, it has close relationships with some
organised interests, including pro Hunting, Fishing
and Bullfighting groups, such as the Asociación
Internacional de Tauromaquia (International Bullfighting
Association), and ultra‐conservative, anti‐abortion rights,
anti‐feminist and other groups that feel aggrieved by pro‐
gressive gender and LGBTQ policies. For example, during
the March 2021 regional election campaign in Madrid,
VOX committed to a 6‐point set of demands of the
ultra‐conservative Catholic organisationHazteOír (which
translates to “make yourself be heard”). The demands
included “promoting the right to life from conception to
natural death,” the legalization of the parental veto, the
repeal of progressive LGBTQ and Transgender Laws, and
the defence of Christian symbols (González, 2021; Hazte
Oír, 2021).
The origins of the party are closely linked to ETA
(Basque Homeland and Freedom) victims’ associations
and other organisations active in the fight against ETA.
ETA is a now disbanded Basque independence ter‐
rorist organisation. Two of VOX’s founders were vic‐
tims of ETA. These associations include the Asociación
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de Víctimas del Terrorismo (Association of Victims
of Terrorism), Fundación Valores y Sociedad (Values
and Society Foundation), and Fundación Villacisneros
(Villacisneros Foundation). In September 2020, VOX
established its own think‐tank, Fundación Disenso
(Dissent Foundation).
Given the party’s nascent organisational develop‐
ment, social media has played an important role in build‐
ing the party, to which we now turn.
3.3. Social Media and Party Building
Once an obscure party desperate for attention from the
mainstreammedia, VOX learned tomake a direct connec‐
tion to potential supporters. The internet, social media,
and applications such as Whatsapp and Telegram have
been essential for forging a collective identity and recruit‐
ing and mobilising activists.
The party attributes some of its initial success to
social media (Ballesteros, 2020). For example, during the
electoral campaign in Andalusia, the party disseminated
a video of Abascal riding a horse in the countryside with
other men and captioned it: “The re‐conquest will begin
in Andalusian territory.” It was shared over a million
times. After experiencing electoral success in Andalusia,
the party learned that sharp criticism of, and an adversar‐
ial relationship with, the mainstream media (in Trump‐
like fashion) would generate additional attention for its
activities (Ramírez, 2020). According to VOX’s communi‐
cation director: “We don’t need bigmedia. They give you
prestige, but to reach the public that interests us and
that lives on their mobile phone, [internet] networks are
enough for us. In the US, Trumpwonwithout the support
of the traditional media” (Negre, 2018).
In mid‐2021 (see Figure 1), VOX had the most follow‐
ers of Spain’s national parties on Instagram, which the
party strategically prioritized alongside Facebook. VOX
took interest in Instagram because of the youth of its
users (Bernardez‐Rodal et al., 2020, p. 3). VOX also has
the most subscribers on YouTube (431,000 compared to
Podemos’ 125,000) and members on Telegram (53,500
compared to Podemos’ 29,752). However, the left wing
Podemos leads, by far, on Twitter and Facebook.
VOX had “greater visibility and impact on social net‐
works” than Spain’s other national parties in a study in
late 2019, a non‐electoral period (Cea Esteruelas, 2019,
p. 41). It achieved greater interaction and engagement























Figure 1. Social media followers. Notes: Followers (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), subscribers (YouTube), and members
(Telegram); rounded, as some platforms only list rounded numbers.
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YouTube, and Instagram). Additionally, by the end of
the April 2019 election campaign, VOX had attained the
greatest “share of voice,” a metric for visibility (Dusster,
2019). This is perhaps not surprising given VOX’s new
party status. A prior study found that previous newcom‐
ers, Podemos and Cs, received more likes and higher
engagement on Instagram in the 2015 and 2016 elec‐
tions (Turnbull‐Dugarte, 2019b).
A study of the content of VOX’s Instagram posts
prior to the April 2019 general elections shows that 56%
relate to a “danger‐enemy dimension,” which includes
the left, separatist nationalism, feminism, and Islam,
immigration and women (Aladro Vico & Requeijo Rey,
2020, p. 211). Another study of Instagram posts finds
that VOX employs “Manichean‐type contrasts such as
‘us/them,’ ‘good/evil…’ ” (Bernardez‐Rodal et al., 2020,
p. 9). The first study concludes that VOX’s posts aim to
recruit activists: “The discourse is that of a civil resistance
movement” (Aladro Vico & Requeijo Rey, 2020, p. 221).
According to Bernardez‐Rodal et al. (2020, p. 3), VOX’s
social media strategy was designed, in part, by Trump
associate Steve Bannon, who appeals to basic emotions
and seeks to construct a “closed group identity built
around the feeling of loss of traditional values.”
On Facebook, VOX pays for its content to reach
potential supporters and its opponents on the left and
extreme left, in hopes of provoking them tomaximize dif‐
fusion (Méndez & Villarino, 2018). Social media is also
key to their mobilisation strategy. According to VOX’s
social media guru, now vice secretary of communication:
“We are a machine for mobilizing people for our events”
(Negre, 2018).
The degree to which social media brings VOX elec‐
toral and other dividends remains to be determined,
especially because the party also now receives a great
deal of attention from traditional media and more
coverage than a comparable party prior to the 2019
Andalusian election, its electoral breakthrough (Olalla
et al., 2019). However, studies of the 15M indignados
movement of 2011 in Spain demonstrate social media’s
ability to mobilize massive protests and bring out new
participants, in that case without the attention of tra‐
ditional media or organisations such as political parties
and unions (Anduiza et al., 2014). Furthermore, compar‐
ative studies indicate that online contact via social net‐
works is important for mobilizing younger voters (Aldrich
et al., 2016).
3.4. Why Grow an Active Base of Members?
Initially, the party sought to recruit members to fund
and organize party activities at a time when the party
attracted little attention from themedia and had no pub‐
lic funding. Members staffed and at times paid for party
events (Segurola, 2014), and they helped get the word
out. With growing public attention, the party also had
to field candidates across the Spanish territory. Its adver‐
sarial relationship with the media likely reinforces the
recruitment of an activist membership base, though,
once it entered Spain’s political institutions, VOX became
more careful about whom it recruited (Interview no. 5).
A larger pool of activists also allowed VOX to organize ral‐
lies across the Spanish territory. These events bring the
party attention and the opportunity to claim to represent
the “real” Spain. As Casals (2021) suggests, VOX carries
the “re‐conquest” narrative to the streets, where, like on
social media, it can make the symbolic and emotional
appeals it prefers.
Thus, VOX has taken the first steps toward the devel‐
opment of a mass‐party‐like organisation by expanding
its territorial presence, recruiting members and activists
and creating collective identity. This has gone along with
the centralisation of power, which we now discuss.
4. Internal Democracy, Centralisation, and Territorial
Conflict
While challenges related to and limits on internal democ‐
racy were present from the start, VOX has experienced
progressive centralisation of decision‐making author‐
ity by and in the hands of the national leadership,
particularly since entering the political institutions in
2018–2019. Organisational change in this direction is
in accord with Pedersen’s (1982) notion of party lifes‐
pan. When parties gain relevance, they reduce internal
democracy. Additionally, it is due to the party’s opposi‐
tion to Spain’s political regions.
The party’s initial open recruitment model and rapid
growth produced internal heterogeneity. The leader‐
ship’s efforts to centralise have both responded to and
provoked internal disputes and factionalism. As we dis‐
cuss below, many conflicts resulted from limits the party
national executive imposed on territorial branch auton‐
omy. Despite the fact that regional branches do not for‐
mally exist, once there is a regional political arena and
representation is obtained, regional interests arise that
may conflict with the national leadership.
Unlike some radical right parties, VOX is not synony‐
mous with a charismatic leader. Its leadership is best
characterised as oligarchic. One can easily imagine the
survival of VOX without Abascal. He is, of course, a pow‐
erful and significant person among the leaders (formally
and informally) participating in the making the most
important decisions—including Javier Ortega Smith, Iván
Espinosa de los Monteros, and Rocío Monasterio (illus‐
trating the closeness of the leadership, the latter two
are a couple). Some belong to the NEC, while others, like
Espinosa and Monasterio, do not. In March 2020, the
party also established a newbody, called the Political and
Institutional Strategy Committee, onwhich they all serve,
along with two additional members.
Like many new parties, VOX initially allowed some
member participation in internal decisions. In part, this
was spurred by Spanish legislation. Spain’s party legis‐
lation requires political parties to have internal party
democracy. VOX’s first attempt to register the party in
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late 2013 with the Ministry of Interior was rejected
because some clauses in the party’s proposed statutes
did not allow for sufficient internal discussion and par‐
ticipation by the rank‐and‐file. The party had to modify
the statutes, in particular regarding the functioning of
its General Assembly (López‐Fonseca, 2014). Thus, VOX’s
first draft statuteswere also designed to give the national
leadership some control over internal processes.
The party’s statutes, approved by the first General
Assembly in July 2014, established the bi‐annual party
congresses, opened to all party members. They also stip‐
ulated the selection of internal party positions and can‐
didates for public office via party elections, which is
not a legal requirement. However, there was one caveat.
Provincial and municipal party organisations with fewer
than 500 party affiliates could select the candidates with‐
out an electoral process, if the candidate or list had the
support of a simple majority of party members and was
vetted by the national leadership.
Electoral success in the December 2018 Andalusian
elections marked a milestone in VOX’s development,
and a reduction in internal party democracy followed.
The General Assembly held in February 2019 limited
the use of party elections to internal party positions.
The selection of candidates for public office came to
depend on the subnational executives, whowere respon‐
sible for bringing their proposals to the NEC for approval,
except for the general and European elections. For these,
the NEC chooses the candidates and only needs to “con‐
sult” with the PECs.
In the context of Covid‐19 pandemic restrictions,
critics of VOX’s national leadership, organized as the
group VoxHabla, were not permitted to participate in
the March 2020 General Assembly, which was only
open to party and public office holders. The Assembly
elected Abascal and his team for another four years.
The party’s Electoral Committee rejected the candidacy
of Carmelo González, leader of VoxHabla, and his alter‐
native list because they lacked sufficient formal back‐
ing. The Assembly approved several changes to the
party statutes, which further reduced internal democ‐
racy. For example, the NEC can now send compulsory
instructions to other party bodies and disband subna‐
tional executives that do not abide by them and replace
them with interim managing committees (gestoras),
with agreement of two‐thirds of the NEC. According to
the previous statutes, the NEC could only dissolve the
subnational committees if its president or a majority of
its members stepped down.
These changes give the NEC more control over the
selection of party cadres at the provincial and local levels.
The central party leadership is thus attempting to retain
control of a party that experienced rapid growth and rel‐
evance with a heterogeneous and largely inexperienced
membership. Begoña Conde, vice secretary of member
training stated that the party shouldwork like an “orches‐
tra: discipline, training and the same score” (“Abascal
sale reforzado,” 2020). Tomás Fernández, vice secretary
of organisation, summarized the changes as “integration
and homogenization” (“Abascal sale reforzado,” 2020).
The leadership’s efforts to centralise provoked inter‐
nal disputes about the lack of transparency and internal
democracy, such as with VoxHabla. Several splits from
the party have also occurred that criticise the centrali‐
sation of power in the hands of Abascal and the ruling
clique, including TúPatria, España Suma, and Valores.
As a consequence of VOX’s remarkable growth
between 2018 and 2020, a series of crises emerged at
all levels of the party organisation. The national leader‐
ship and different groups within the provincial—and to
a lesser degree—local executives vied for control over
(a) finances, (b) the vetting of electoral lists, (c) organic
positions inside the party, and (d) government‐formation
negotiations. In the years 2019 and 2020, we identi‐
fied 15 such major provincial crises (Albacete, Asturias,
Almería, Baleares, Cádiz, Cantabria, Granada, Jaén, León,
Murcia, Sevilla, Toledo, Valencia, Valladolid, and Zamora)
and five municipal crises (Algeciras, Badajoz, Málaga,
Toledo, Melilla). Exceptionally, the crises erupted over
disagreements encompassing all four elements, as in
the case of Murcia beginning in the spring of 2019.
The attempt by party founders to forestall the entrench‐
ment of regional interests by skipping the autonomous
communities (regions) in the party’s structure only
moved the focus one level down, to the PECs. Several
conflicts gained media attention and an avalanche of
denunciations ended up in Spanish courts.
Since 2019, candidate selection for party lists for
regional and local elections is, in theory, the preroga‐
tive of the provincial and municipal executives. However,
the lists made by PECs must go to the NEC for vetting
and approval. This has generated conflict between the
national leadership who wants to have the final say on
the lists and the provincial leadership who resents this,
and between the provincial leadership and adversarial
provincial groups who want to take the reins of the party
organisation. Examples of this type of conflict occurred
across the whole country. The NEC and, more concretely,
Abascal and Ortega Smith (president and general secre‐
tary, respectively), used the infighting within the subna‐
tional organisations to force the dissolution of provincial
and municipal executives and set up interim caretaker
executives (gestoras), controlled from Madrid.
Internal party elections have been another major
source of conflict. Procedural irregularities tainted many
provincial and national party elections. For example,
incumbent candidates were able to use the party appara‐
tus to their advantage and alternative candidacies were
discouraged. Several of the party’s internal elections
between 2018 and 2020 were challenged in court by dis‐
gruntled rank‐and‐file party members or by unsuccess‐
ful candidates, such as in Granada, Seville, and Valencia
in 2020. The critical platform VoxHabla was established
precisely with the objective of denouncing the irregu‐
larities of internal party elections in 2020. The national
leadership agreed to repeat party elections in Malaga,
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Alicante, and Jaen due to irregularities. Revealing the
concerns of the party leadership, Abascal expressed that
he is “worried’’ party elections “have generated divisions
and conflict in some provinces” andwondered if it would
not be better to “suspend this type of provincial elections
because they generate a lot of uncertainty and infighting”
(González, 2020).
Party finance has been the third major arena of
infighting. Provincial party organisations have their own
bank accounts, where they receive public funds and
members’ fees and donations. But these accounts are
managed by the national leadership, leaving no finan‐
cial autonomy to provincial leaders. In some cases, this
pushed provincial leaders to create parallel accounts,
a practice which members of the provincial leadership
or rank‐and‐file have challenged legally, for example in
Murcia and Valencia.
Thus, the central leadership’s efforts to centralise
have both responded to and provoked internal disputes
and factionalism. The end result of this tug of war
between the national leadership and the provincial and
local branches has been the weakening of the party’s
internal democracy and the concentration of power in
the hands of the NEC.
5. Conclusion
A young party that first gained representation in late
2018, VOX rapidly became politically relevant at all state
levels. Despite being a new party, VOX did not choose
a novel organisational format. It adopted the structure
of mass parties albeit in embryonic form. VOX strove to
achieve rootedness on the ground via territorial penetra‐
tion, to recruit a large activist membership base, and to
create collective identity, including through the use of
social networks, with significant control retained by the
central party leadership.
VOX initially adopted an open recruitmentmodel and
provided members with input into the selection of party
officers and candidates. Also, the national leadership has
progressively concentrated decision‐making authority in
its hands, particularly since entering the political institu‐
tions. Centralisation in part responds to organisational
needs, as Michels (1962) discovered. VOX is not unusual
in doing so—new parties commonly confront a tension
between the desire of the founding core to maintain its
position and influence, and the need to develop a viable
organisational structure (Bolleyer, 2013). Nevertheless,
organisational choices were also the result of the central
party leadership’s desire to forestall the articulation of
territorial interests, given the party’s Spanish nationalist
and state centralist ideology. Efforts to centralise have
both resulted from, and in turn provoked, several inter‐
nal disputes.
A few aspects of the party stand out. The first is the
degree to which it articulates its nationalism in opposi‐
tion to Spain’s own peripheral national identities and in
favour of a centralised state. This has led to a party struc‐
ture, which, unusually, does not conform to the struc‐
ture of the state. This organisational mismatch is likely
to continue to present challenges to the party, given the
reality of Spain’s autonomous communities. Relatedly,
the party may face the dilemma of whether to adapt
its pitch, including in which language, to Spain’s distinct
historical communities in order to grow in places such
as Catalonia and Galicia. VOX also stands out due to its
staunch neoliberal economic positions. It remains to be
seen whether the party will adapt its economic positions
in an attempt to appeal to more voters. Finally, the party
is ultra conservative, with strong ties to anti‐feminist and
anti‐LGBTQ groups.
Much remains unknown about VOX’s organisation,
particularly about its members and activists. Future
research that draws on participant observation tech‐
niques and/or surveys of activists, providing windows
into the party, would be particularly beneficial.
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